I have just finished reading the Supreme Court of Ghana’s 84-page landmark judgment affirming the constitutionality of the procedure used in the removal of former Chief Justice Ger
The report indicates that i have just finished reading the Supreme Court of Ghana’s 84-page landmark judgment affirming the constitutionality of the procedure used in the removal of former Chief Justice Gertrude Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo. In dismissing the two suits (consolidated) that challenged the President’s actions and the Council of State’s role, the Court clarified the process, upheld the self-executing nature of Article 146, and reinforced the calibrated timing of the right to be heard. This decision not only validates the removal process but also sets a precedent for how future constitutional disputes over judicial independence and executive authority will be resolved.
It further notes that the suits were brought by Vincent Ekow Assafuah (Writ No. J1/18/2025) and Theodore Kofi Atta-Quartey (Writ No. J1/21/2025), against the Attorney-General. The lawsuits challenged the constitutional validity of the removal process initiated against the then-sitting Chief Justice, Her Ladyship Justice Gertrude Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo. The President at the time, John Dramani Mahama, had received three petitions for her removal, forwarded them to the Council of State, determined that a prima facie case existed, suspended the Chief Justice, and appointed a Committee of Inquiry. The Plaintiffs asserted that this process was unconstitutional.
1. The antecedent-notification argument (Writ No. J1/18/2025)
The Plaintiff argued that the removal process violated the principles of natural justice, specifically the audi alteram partem (hear the other side) rule.
2. The lack of regulation/published instrument argument (Writ No. J1/21/2025)
This Plaintiff focused on “legality through transparency”.
The Attorney-General, represented by his Deputy Dr. Justice Srem-Sai, vehemently contested both writs:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice I.O. Tanko Amadu (with Justices E. Yonny Kulendi, H. Kwofie, S. Dzamefe, H. Amaleboba, and the concurrence of Justice D. Adjei and G.S. Suurbaareh) dismissed the consolidated action in its entirety. The court’s primary determinations were as follows:
The court rejected the AG’s contention that the matter was a non-justiciable “political question”. It ruled that whenever it is alleged that an authority has acted outside constitutional limits, the court has full jurisdiction to review it. However, the political nature of the actors scales the depth of the review, meaning the court will check for fairness and caprice but will not substitute its own policy appraisal for that of the President or the Council of State.
2. The right to be heard is calibrated, not postponed
The court held that the CJ is fully entitled to a fair hearing, but the Constitution expressly routes this right to the Committee stage under Article 146(8).
A prima facie determination does not adjudicate rights; it merely decides if there is a “ground for proceeding.” Just as a criminal defendant is called to answer at a trial rather than during initial investigative filings, the CJ’s right to defend herself ripens before the Committee. Importing a mandatory second hearing prior to this filter is textually unsupported.
The court heavily rejected the notion that constitutional powers lie dormant until subsidiary regulations are passed. Article 146 explicitly names the actors, outlines the grounds, dictates the Committee’s composition, and guarantees an in-camera hearing. Allowing the absence of a C.I to paralyze this mechanism would hold the supreme law hostage to legislative or executive inaction. The court cited historical jurisprudence (such as the Article 22 spousal property rights cases) to prove that the Judiciary routinely enforces constitutional mandates despite failures to pass supplementary legislation, even where clearly mandated.
The court noted that during the pendency of the action, the CJ was fully furnished with the petitions as a matter of executive courtesy, submitted responses, and was ultimately removed from office. Plaintiff Assafuah attempted to discontinue his writ on grounds of mootness. The court refused the discontinuance, ruling that constitutional actions brought by citizens under Article 2(1) belong to the public interest. Authoritative constitutional declarations cannot be “spirited away” at the whim of private litigants when conditions shift.
